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Chapter 8 
All Dressed Up But Not Invited to the Party: 
Can Taiwan Join the United Nations Now the Cold War Is Over? 
Vincent Wei-cheng Wang 
1. Introduction 
History is full of ironies and surprises. The end of the Cold War has injected some new 
vitality to the once moribund United Nations. Originally formed to promote peace, 
security, and cooperation among the world's nations, the United Nations, however, 
until recently was made alternately ineffective and irrelevant by the East-West and the 
North-South conflicts. But thanks to an increasing need for global governance in the 
post-Cold War era, the United Nations seems suddenly thrust back into limelight. It is 
entrusted to play an even more forceful role on a wide array of important issues in the 
future, from peace-keeping and humanitarian intervention to environmental protection, 
despite states' safeguard of their sacred sovereignty. 1 In considerable measures, the 
United Nations has contributed to world peace and development, by bringing countries 
and peoples under its wings in attempts to resolve their conflicts and attain their 
1 On the changing role of the United Nations in the post-Cold War era, see KAREN A. MINGST AND 
MARGARET P. KARNS, THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1995); THOMAS G. WEISS, DAVID P. FORSYTHE AND ROGER A. COATE, THE UNITED 
NATIONS AND CHANGING WORLD POLITICS (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1994); J. MARTIN 
ROCHESTER, WAITING FOR THE MILLENNIUM: THE UNITED NATIONS AND TIIE FUTURE WORLD ORDER 
(Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1993); K. P. SAKSENA, REPORMING THE 
UNITED NATIONS: THE CHALLENGE OF RELEVANCE (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1993); Gene M. 
Lyons, Rethinking the United Nations, 38 MERSHON INTERNATIONAL STUDIES REVIEW 95 (April 1994). 
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common goals. The year 1995 marked the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the 
United Nations. This milestone clearly shows that the United Nations has surpassed its 
predecessor, the League of Nations, in terms of both longevity and success. 
Despite its lofty goals, however, the United Nations has been used as an instrument 
by certain countries against others. Consequently it has done injustice. One of its most 
cruel relics from the Cold War era is the exclusion of Taiwan,2 a nation of twenty-one 
million people, an increasingly important actor on the world stage and a founding 
member of this very world organ -- that makes the irony even more poignant. Currently 
Taiwan is the only known country that does not have a seat in the United Nations not 
by its own choice. 3 Since 1971, Taiwan has actually suffered a singular "diplomatic 
apartheid" imposed by China in the United Nations and on the world stage in general. 
The Cold War may be over for most countries and the seeming resolution of major 
conflicts prompted one author to proclaim the "end of history" .4 But it is hardly over 
for Taiwan, despite some prominent retorts. 5 Taiwan, despite its admirable success 
story and considerable economic might, still finds itself "all dressed up, but not invited" 
to the big party of fellow nations. 
This chapter reviews the history and examines the key issues related to Taiwan's 
efforts to enter the United Nations, as well as offers some practical suggestions. The 
next three sections juxtapose the United Nations idealist principle of universality (of all 
states and peoples) and realist power politics and they review the evolution of the once 
contentious China representation issue in light of the changing politics in the United 
Nations. Section 4 also examines how the United Nations has accommodated divided 
states by comparing two models: parallel representation and exclusive representation. 
Section 5 tests Taiwan's statehood, which is requisite of United Nations membership. 
Section 6 discusses the domestic and international reasons for Taiwan's United Nations 
bid. The final section analyzes several prerequisites, models, and approaches for 
Taiwan's re-entry into the United Nations. Although this chapter focuses on the United 
Nations issue, since admittance into the United Nations is a litmus test for Taiwan's 
2 The term "Taiwan" refers here to the Republic of China (ROC), whose capital is in Taipei, whereas 
"China" refers to the People's Republic of China (PRC), whose capital is in Beijing (Peking). 
3 A few countries choose not to join the United Nations, because they espouse permanent neutrality 
(Switzerland), or they carry little international significance, or cannot afford membership dues (Tonga 
and Cook Islands). Although some African states had sought the expulsion of South Africa under 
apartheid and some Arab states had urged Israel's expulsion from the United Nations, in reality no action 
has ever been taken under Article 5 (suspension) or Article 6 (expulsion) of the United Nations Charter. 
A. LEROY BENNETT, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: PRINCIPLES AND ISSUES (Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall, 6th ed. 1995), at 82. From 1974 to 1994, the United Nations barred South Africa 
from participating by denying the credentials of the representatives sent by the white minority 
government. 
4 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History?, 16 THE NATIONAL INTEREST 3 (Summer 1989). 
5 Paul Tsongas, a former American presidential candidate, once declared: "The Cold War is over, 
and the winners are Germany, Japan, and Taiwan." Quoted from Edward Alden and Franz Schurman. 
Neo-Nationalist Fallacies, 87 FOREIGN POLICY 110-111 (Summer 1992). 
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diplomatic endeavors in the post-Cold War era, many issues explored here have 
implications for Taiwan's attempts to join other international organizations in particular 
and to elevate its international stature in general. 
2. The United Nations: Idealist Aspiration Versus Realist Verity 
Envisaged during World War Two, the United Nations was created after the war to 
maintain global peace and security and to promote international cooperation. By 
evoking the idealist tradition in international relations, the United Nations strived t 
embrace all nations to work together in achieving their common goals, henc 
eliminating the sources of war. The United Nations' idealism is most manifest in th 
principle of universality, the notion that the world body should be open to all nations. 6 
Today the United Nations is a nearly universal body in terms of its membership. 
There are currently 185 member states (see Table 1 below). 7 Nearly all territories on 
earth are represented in this body. However, there are important exceptions such as 
Switzerland (voluntary neutrality) and Taiwan (involuntary exclusion). 8 
Given the increasing interdependence among states and peoples, and given the nature 
of many global problems such as the environment, population and resources that 
mandate transnational coordination, the United Nations is expected to play an even 
greater part in the years to come. So the United Nations has seemingly avoided the 
plight of its predecessor, the League of Nations, whose failure contributed to the 
outbreak of mankind's last total war, World War Two. 
Despite its moral overtones, the United Nations is an eminently political body. 
Occasional gaps between idealism and realism (hence the designation "nearly 
universal") have produced such glaring anomalies as Taiwan, whose 21 million 
inhabitants have not been properly represented in the United Nations since 1971. The 
tension between these two trends can often be found in the spirit and the deeds of the 
United Nations. 
The United Nations was intended to be a universal organization. In fact, the word 
"universality" has two meanings: both all states and all persons should be properly 
represented in the United Nations. Article 4 of the United Nations Charter states that 
membership is "open to all other peace-loving states" willing to accept the obligations 
' It is proper to draw an analogy to the theory of "popular sovereignty" of democracy at the global 
level. The United Nations (government) is made up by the states (the people or their representatives), 
governs with the consent of the states (the people) and should enhance their interests. 
7 United Nations Department of Public Infom1ation, Press Release, ORG/1190, 15 December 1994. 
The latest state admitted as a Member was Palau. 
8 ROBERT E. RIGGS AND JACK C. PLANO, THE UNITED NATIONS: INTERNATIONAL 0RGANIZA110N 
AND WORLD POLITICS (Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 2d ed. 1994), at 44. 
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of the Charter. 9 Article 55 calls on the United Nations to "promote universal respect 
for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. "10 Furthermore, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, 11 the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights12 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights13 
all emphasize that every person is entitled to participate in political, cultural and 
economic activities. 
When states are represented in the United Nations, they are equally represented, at 
least formally speaking. No one state possesses a higher status than another state. 14 
Article 2 of the Charter points out that the United Nations is "based on the principle 
of sovereign equality of all its Members" and that all members shall "settle their 
international disputes by peaceful means. "15 
These moral principles are, however, sometimes subject to purely political 
considerations. For instance, which political entities constitute "states" and which ones 
are "peace-loving" or deemed "able and willing to carry out international obligations" 
are highly political decisions. In fact, whether an aspiring member can become a 
member of the international community has to be essentially "certified" by the United 
Nations. The very article that proclaims universal membership also provides that only 
those peace-loving states which, "in the judgment of the Organization, are able and 
willing to carry out [Charter] obligations" can become a member. 16 In other words, 
if a peace-loving state cannot obtain a positive ruling from the United Nations on its 
peace-loving nature and capacity, it can be excluded. 
In addition, such a verdict is rendered through a political process. Article 4(2) of the 
Charter stipulates that states can be admitted to the Organization only with "a decision 
of the General Assembly [by a two-thirds majority] upon the recommendation of the 
Security Council [where five states hold veto powers on non-procedural matters]. "17 
9 Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. xvi, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 
Bevans 1153, Article 4(1). 
10 Id. Article 55. 
11 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, 
at 71 (1948). 
12 G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967). 
13 G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 993 U.N. T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967). 
14 All states are sovereign; they answer to no higher authority and they are formally equal among one 
another. This is why the United Nations is only an inter-national organization, the effectiveness of which 
depends upon the voluntary cooperation of egoistic states. It is not a supra-national world government 
that can dispense authoritative decisions above and sometimes against the will of a state. By contrast, the 
European Commission is closer to being a supranational body. The European Court of Justice has 
established its right to overrule national laws when in conflict with European Community laws. 
15 Charter of the United Nations, supra note 9, Article 2(1) and 2(3). 
16 Id. Article 4(1). 
17 Id. Article 4(2); see also Articles 18 and 23. According to Article 23(1), the five permanent 
members of the Security Council are the Republic of China, France, the Soviet Union, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. The Chinese seat was held by the Nationalist government from 1945 to 
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This means that any one of the five great powers, should it so desire, can single-
handedly keep an aspiring state out of the United Nations. In fact, this happened often 
in the infamous early history of the Organization. Bestowing the veto power on the five 
permanent members of the Security Council was a pragmatic recognition that achieving 
world peace would require the concert of great powers. However, such special status 
has also frequently handcuffed the United Nations and tarnished the image of the very 
international body created to promote peace and avoid another great war. 
So on the one hand the United Nations advocates the moral principle of universality, 
while on the other hand politics has kept Taiwan out of the Organization. To understand 
why this anomaly has occurred is not only the first step toward a solution to the agony 
of a particular people, but also a necessary step of making the United Nations a truly 
universal organization. But first we have to understand the changing international 
politics of the United Nations since its founding and how those politics have largely 
shaped the evolution of the China representation issue. 
3. The Changing World Politics in the United Nations 
In 1945, fifty-one "peace-loving" states founded the United Nations. Many of these 
founding members had fought against the Axis powers during World War Two. In those 
early days, the United States led an "automatic majority" in the Organization, which 
could then be used to further American foreign policy. This was a clear example of the 
political nature of the United Nations. During the first ten years, admission was granted 
grudgingly. As East-West lines hardened, the majority led by the United States denied 
the necessary votes to applicants from the Soviet bloc while the Soviet Union, leading 
a frustrated minority, used its veto to block the admission of most other applicants. The 
breakthrough in this stalemate came in 1955 when sixteen new members were admitted 
in the form of a package deal. Since then membership has been available virtually for 
the asking. Table 1 shows the present member states by years of admission. 
With the entry of so many new member states, mostly poor former colonies from the 
Third World, the politics of the United Nations also changed. The East-West conflict 
was pushed aside by the North-South conflict. Third World states, which struggled with 
underdevelopment, over time grew into a "tyranny of the majority" as they constituted 
more than two-thirds of the membership. They saw the West, particularly the United 
1971 and by the Communist government since then. The Soviet Union seat has been taken over by its 
successor state, the Russian Federation, after the breakup of the fom1er Soviet Union. Article 27 
establishes the veto power of these five pennanent members on non-procedural, i.e. substantive or 
important matters. An interesting question pertains to the issue of which China is really in the United 
Nations: the original ROC is now out, yet the "ROC" now in the United Nations is actually the PRC. 
However, amending the Charter ("to set the record straight") will require the approval and ratification 
of two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly, including all the pem1anent members of the 
Security Council (Article 108). 
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States, as the major impediment to their yearnings. They pushed for a New 
International Economic Order that would fundamentally redistribute global wealth and 
income at the expense of the North. Gradually the United States found itself in the 
minority, casting most vetos, including its support of Israel, in the 1970s and 1980s, 
when the Soviet Union was largely irrelevant on North-South issues. Table 2 shows the 
changing lot of the five permanent members of the Security Council. Figure 1 shows 
the percentage of issues either superpower voted with the majority. 
These changing politics in the United Nations provide an excellent perspective to 
understand the changing lot of Taiwan within the Organization, as is explained below. 
4. The China Representation Issue 
The political nature of the United Nations was further demonstrated by how the 
Organization handled the admission of divided states: Germany, Korea, Vietnam and 
China, each a persisting legacy of the Cold War and domestic politics. Roughly 
speaking, two models have been used: parallel representation (Germany and Korea) and 
exclusive representation (Vietnam and China). 
Both German republics were admitted in 1973 as a result of detente and intra-German 
rapprochement. 18 After Germany was unified in 1990, the two separate German 
representations in the United Nations became one. 19 Before they formally became a 
member of the United Nations in 1991, both North Korea and South Korea had also 
held observer status in the Organization. By contrast, neither North Vietnam nor South 
Vietnam was ever a member of the United Nations. However, a unified (communist) 
Vietnam was admitted in 1977. So the pattern for these divided states was a 
postponement of admission until an "internal" solution could be reached one way or the 
other: either the two sides of a divided state could be simultaneously or consecutively 
admitted (parallel representation as in the case of Germany, Korea and Yemen) or only 
the victor side could be admitted (exclusive representation as in the case of Vietnam). 
In the cases of Germany and Yemen, when the two sides were unified, parallel 
representations became an exclusive one. In fact, as the German case indicated, formal 
separate international identities for the two German states had not prevented their 
eventual unification. A unified Korea in the future may also follow this model. 
The case of China however was different. The ROC was a founding member of the 
United Nations. Hence, the issue could not be postponed. In fact, ever since the 
Communist regime was established on the mainland and the Nationalist government 
moved to Taiwan in 1949, the United Nations had to wrestle with this issue: which 
18 See generally WILLIAM E. GRIFFITH, THE OSTPOLITIK OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OP GERMANY 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1978). 
19 The case of Yemen was somewhat similar. Yemen was admitted to the United Nations in 1947 and 
Democratic Yemen in 1967. On 22 May 1990, the two countries merged and have since been represented 
as one Yemen. 
____ J 
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China should represent China in the Organization? The issue was further exacerbated 
because neither China would officially admit the reality of two Chinas. Therefore, the 
issue was treated as one of representation rather than of admission to membership. The 
question was which China could exclusively represent all Chinese people in the United 
Nations rather than whether each China should represent only the people under its 
jurisdiction. 20 
The zero-sum diplomatic struggle between the ROC and PRC defined the politics of 
the Chinese representation issue in the United Nations. Under the grand design of the 
Cold War, the United States contributed to that battle, by inflicting upon the United 
Nations what a critic has called "an ideological and a political test for membership. "21 
As it turned out, the ROC held that exclusive representation from 1945 to 1971 when 
the PRC was excluded and the PRC has held that post ever since while the ROC has 
been excluded. Either period of exclusive representation (and exclusion) created an 
unfortunate victim and the practice stood in stark contrast to the principle of 
universality. 
From the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 to Kissinger and Nixon's "opening 
China" in 1971, the ROC was a major beneficiary of the Cold War when the United 
States sought to contain Russian-Chinese communism. On the contrary, Kissinger and 
Nixon's "opening China" and the China-United States rapprochement changed Taiwan's 
fortune overnight. Taiwan became a major victim of detente, trying to curb the 
uncontrollable decline of its international status. 22 As a United States protege, 
Taiwan's fate waxed and waned with that of the United States in the United Nations. 
The United States adopted two strategies to support the ROC in the United Nations: 
moratorium (1950-1961) and important question (1961-1971). The moratorium tactic 
was used when the United States controlled a majority of votes in the United Nations. 
Year after year, the United States used its influence to prevent proposals calling for 
admission of the PRC and expulsion of the ROC from being put on the agenda of the 
General Assembly. Starting from the early 1960s, however, an increasing number of 
Third World member states wanted to seat the government in Beijing. Because these 
20 The PRC's posture toward the United Nations hefore 1971 was one of "lovl:! mt! or leave me, hut 
don't leave me alone." SAMUELS. KIM, CHINA, THE UNITED NATIONS, AND WORLD ORDER (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979), at 99. 
21 Congressman Robert G. Torricelli's testimony in the United States Congress, House of 
Representatives, Subcommittees on International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights, 
and Asia and the Pacific Affairs, Should Taiwan be Admitted to the United Nations?, Joint Hearing, 
103rd Congress, 2nd session, 14 July 1994 (Washington, D.C.: United States Governml:!nt Printing 
Office, 1994), at 6. 
22 Richard Nixon actually pursul:!d two sets of detente: on!:! bl:!tween the United States and the Soviet 
Union and the other between the United States and the PRC. The latter detente was made possible by the 
Sino-Soviet split. See JOHN SPANIER AND STEVEN w. HOOK, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE WORLD 
WAR II (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 13th ed. 1995). 
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Third World states were anti-American, they saw the seat held by the ROC, supported 
by the United States, as unjust. 23 
As a result, the United States had to adopt a new strategy by defining the China 
representation issue as an important issue, requiring a two-thirds majority vote in the 
General Assembly. 24 The string of United States and Nationalist voting victories, 
though impressive, was finally broken in 1971. On 25 October 1971, the Twenty-Sixth 
General Assembly rejected the "important question" draft resolution by a vote of 55 in 
favor, 59 against, 15 abstentions and 2 absent. Once this critical procedural protection 
was lost, General Assembly Resolution 2758 was adopted, upon a proposal of Albania, 
by a vote of 76 in favor, 35 against, 17 abstentions and 3 absent. Resolution 2758 gave 
the China seat to the PRC and in effect expelled the ROC.25 
The then United States Ambassador to the United Nations, George Bush, had worked 
to introduce a draft resolution for "dual representation" of both the PRC and the ROC, 
with the PRC being seated as a Permanent Member of the Security Council. But since 
Resolution 2758 was adopted and the ROC maintained that it had "withdrawn" from the 
United Nations, the draft "dual representation" resolution never came to a vote in the 
General Assembly. The zero-sum mentality of both Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong 
and the United Nations politics at that time made it impossible. One has to wonder how 
different Taiwan's international status would have been today if the scheme of dual 
representation had been adopted instead of Resolution 2758. 
Resolution 2758 was an ugly piece of remanufactured history and probably an illegal 
document. 26 Its tone was completely one-sided. It sought to "restore the lawful rights 
of the People's Republic of China" as if the PRC were a founding member of the 
United Nations. The ROC was in fact a founding member of the United Nations; the 
PRC was not established until 1949. It recognized the representatives of the PRC as 
"the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations" and "the People's 
2
' Furthermore, China sided with the Third World Non-Aligned Movement, at least rhetorically. See 
KING c. CHEN (ED.), CHINA AND THE THREE WORLDS (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1979). 
24 According to Article 18(2) of the Charter, "the admission of new Members to the United Nations. 
the suspension of the rights and privileges of membership, [and] the expulsion of Members" are importam 
questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority. Article 18(3) adds that "the determination of additional 
categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority" shall be made by simple majority. On 15 
December 1961, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1668 (XVI), which decided that "in 
accordance with Article 18 of the Charter, any proposal to change the representation of China is an 
important question." U.N. Doc. A/5100, at 66. 
25 G.A. Res. 2758 (XXVI), 25 October 1971, U.N. Doc. A/8429, at 2, reprinted in Appendix 2. 
Technically the ROC was listed as not participating in United Nations activities even though Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Chow Shu-kai had announced the ROC's decision to withdraw from the United Nations 
prior to the vote. Note that the Charter deliberately made no provision for the withdrawal of member 
governments. 
26 On the illegality of Resolution 2758, see John R. Bolton's testimony in the United States Congress. 
House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, H. Con. Res. 63, Relating to the 
Republic of China (Taiwan's) Participation in the United Nations, Hearing, 104th Congress, 1st session. 
3 August 1995 (Washington, D.C.: United States Governn1ent Printing Office, 1995), at 46-47 and 81-95. 
---- J 
' l ____ _ 
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Republic of China is one of the five permanent members of the Security Council" 
notwithstanding the fact that Article 23(1) of the Charter provides that the ROC is a 
permanent member. It also decided to "expel the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek 
from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and all the 
organizations related to it." This decision openly violated the spirit of universality 
which underlies the United Nations. 
Most importantly, as John Bolton has pointed out, 27 Resolution 2758 violated the 
United Nations Charter. It had de facto, but not de jure, the effect of admitting a new 
member (PRC), expelling a sitting member (ROC) and replacing a Permanent Member 
of the Security Council, all without Security Council action, as mandated by the 
Charter. 28 The supporters of Resolution 2758 argued that none of these results was an 
"important question" under the United Nations Charter and ultimately a majority of the 
General Assembly even agreed with this. 
It is true that if the PRC had applied for United Nations membership (Article 4), 
such strategy would have been foiled by a veto from the ROC and the United States. 
Similarly, had the PRC sought the suspension (Article 5) or expulsion (Article 6) of the 
ROC, the scheme would have been equally unsuccessful, because these are "important 
questions" requiring a two-thirds majority vote. The PRC' s procedural approach was 
brilliantly executed amidst changing geopolitics and Resolution 2758 was adopted. 
Figure 2 traces the changing voting patterns on the China representation issue in the 
General Assembly. 
The propitious change of wind that aided the PRC's entry strategy and undermined 
the ROC's fight for its United Nations seat was President Richard Nixon's 
announcement of his trip to China. With the United Nations example, countries quickly 
shifted recognition from Taipei to Beijing, including Japan (1972) and the United States 
(1979). At the immense pressure of Beijing, other United Nations organs quickly 
followed the lead of the General Assembly. 29 After 1980 representatives of Taipei 
completely disappeared from the United Nations scene. 3° Furthermore, the Chinese 
Communist government religiously and unfailingly imposed its "one China" policy upon 
each and every country that would establish formal ties with it. This policy holds that 
the PRC is the only legal government of China and that Taiwan is a part of China and 
so, by syllogism, Taiwan is a part of the PRC. 
27 Id. at 47. 
28 Charter of the United Nations, supra note 9, Articles 4(1), 6, 23(1) and 108. 
29 G.A. Resolution 396 (V) of 1950 established a precedent that whenever more than one authority 
claims to be the goverlll1lent entitled to United Nations representation, other United Nations bodies should 
take into account the decisions of the General Assembly in deciding which delegation to seat within its 
halls. U.N. Doc. A/1775. Note, however, tliat the General Assembly can only recommend, but not 
instruct, other United Nations bodies what to do. 
30 The exclusion of Taiwan from the United Nations is so complete that even data on Taiwan are 
expurgated from United Nations official publications. Given Taiwan's importance for the world economy. 
this practice infringes upon one's right to knowledge and information. 
---------------------
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Due to China's importance and sensitivity, the world is unwilling to challenge the 
PRC over Taiwan. The PRC's suffocating diplomatic apartheid on Taiwan is thus 
complete. Although the Beijing government purports to speak for all of China, 
including Taiwan, that island and its 21 million people remain unrepresented in the 
United Nations. Resolution 2758 was clearly inadequate and unjust: the PRC indeed 
received a seat commensurate with its stature, yet Taiwan was left without 
representation in the United Nations. This is perhaps the most blatant breach of the 
United Nations principle of universality. 
But why then does this injustice continue? It continues because the world's key 
players, including the United States, have been unwilling to challenge the PRC on this 
and have even employed peculiar and inconsistent legal arguments, which often play 
into Beijing's tunes, to deny the ROC its rightful place. They argue, for example, that 
Taiwan is not a state. Therefore, it does not deserve a seat in the United Nations. They 
also argue that because Taiwan does not consider itself separate from China, therefore 
Taiwan cannot be recognized or seated in the United Nations. Yet at the same time, 
they warn Taiwan not to seek independence as they will not recognize an independent 
Taiwan. 31 This contravenes their own fundamental values such as freedom of 
expression and self-determination. 
Nevertheless, is Taiwan not a state? Does Taiwan cease to be a state when a country 
shifts diplomatic recognition to Beijing? Is Taiwan not more state-like than many United 
Nations member states? The next section seeks to answer these questions. 
5. Taiwan: State or Province? 
Taiwan's ambiguous identity, an artificial product of the world's major players to serve 
their own political purposes, appears increasingly anachronistic. 32 It is important to 
assess Taiwan's intrinsic status, before diplomatic hot air such as "one China" confuses 
our understanding of the issue. What is Taiwan's formal status: a state or a province? 
This is a critical question, since United Nations membership is only open to states, not 
to provinces. 
Article 1 of the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States of 1933 lists the four 
qualifications of "the state as a person of international law: (a) a permanent population; 
(b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the 
other states. "33 According to these criteria, Taiwan clearly is a state. The exclusion 
of Taiwan from the United Nations cannot, therefore, be justified in international law. 
31 See, for example, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Kent 
Wiedemann's testimony in H. Con. Res. 63, supra note 26, at 29-46 and 66-72. 
32 Tom Lantos, Chairman of the Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations, 
and Human Rights, opening remarks in Should Taiwan be Admitted, supra note 21, at 2. 
33 Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (Montevideo Convention), Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 
3097, T.S. No. 881, 3 Bevans 145, 165 L.N.T.S. 19, Article 1. 
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First, Taiwan has a permanent population. If mm1-states such as Antigua and 
Barbuda, the Seychelles, Dominica, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Liechtenstein, 
San Marino and Andorra, each with less than 100,000 people can join the United 
Nations and more than thirty other United Nations member states have a population of 
less than one million,34 one can conclude that no state is too small to qualify for 
membership. In fact, Taiwan's population of 21 million would place it in the top third 
of all United Nations members. 
In terms of defined territory, the ROC has effectively and continuously ruled the 
islands of Taiwan, Pescadores (Penghu), Quemoy (Kinmen) and Matsu since 1949, 35 
with a total area of 36,000 km2 (14,000 mi2), this is slightly larger than Massachusetts, 
Connecticut and Rhode Island combined or slightly smaller than the Netherlands but 
slightly larger than Belgium. In fact, the PRC has never ruled Taiwan. How can the 
PRC claim that Taiwan is a PRC province if it has never ruled it? Even the 
Palestinians, a people long without territory, have enjoyed observer status in the United 
Nations, through the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), now "Palestine" in the 
United Nations lexicon. 
Regarding government, the ROC government moved from the mainland to Taiwan 
in 1949 and has remained there ever since. Although it lost most of the territory and 
people it previously controlled to the Communists, it nevertheless has effectively 
exercised on Taiwan all governing functions such as taxation, armed forces, elections, 
foreign relations and so forth. Furthermore, Taiwan's rapid democratization since 1987 
has a silent effect of rejecting PRC's sovereignty claim over Taiwan. For instance, 
Taiwan's democratization will culminate in the direct popular election of the ROC 
President in March 1996. How can a province elect a president? Only a state can. The 
34 For a list of these mini-states, see WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1992 (Washington, D.C.: World 
Bank, 1992), at 285. 
35 A minor issue pertains to whether the ROC controls Taiwan. A minority of scholars and politicians 
argue that the international status of Taiwan remains undecided. They point out that President Truman, 
in ordering the Seventh Fleet to prevent the Communist attack on Taiwan in June 1950, also declared "the 
determination of the future status of Fom1osa (Taiwan) must await the restoration of the security in the 
Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan. or consideration by the United Nations." Department of State 
Bulletin, 3 July 1950, at 5. See RALPH CLOUGH. IsLAND CHINA (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1978), at 8-9. They further point out that in the 1951 Japanese Peace Treaty signed at 
San Francisco, Japan merely renounced, in Article 2, "all right, title, and claim" to Taiwan (a Japanese 
colony from 1895 to 1945), but did not specify to whom the title was transferred. Nor did the 28 April 
1952 ROC-Japan Peace Treaty explicitly provide for the return of Taiwan to China. These documents 
are reproduced in HUNGDAH CHIU (ED.), CllINA AND THE QUESTION OF TAIWAN: DOCUMENTS AND 
ANALYSIS (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973). That Taiwan's status is still undetermined is a peculiar 
argument to forestall PRC's claim over Taiwan. However, it is also an insignificant one, since the ROC 
can still ascertain its control over Taiwan through the principle of effective occupation and control (for 
a long period of time). See 2 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE (London: Longman 
Greens, 7th ed. 1952), at 611: "the effect of a treaty of peace is that conditions remain as at the 
conclusion of peace .... Thus ... if nothing is stipulated regarding conquered territory, it remains in the 
hands of the possessor, who may annex it." 
96 Vincent Wei-cheng Wang 
PRC claims to represent the people of Taiwan, but has it paid for these people's share 
of membership fee in the United Nations?36 Do the people of Taiwan agree to let the 
PRC represent them? Judging from the fact that Taiwan's bid to join the United Nations 
enjoys broad support in the Taiwanese society, the answer is a clear no. 
The only controversy is the last qualification: the capacity to enter into relations with 
other states. But how does one interpret "foreign relations"? If it indicates formal 
diplomatic relations, then it is true that only some 30 states maintain formal ties with 
the ROC. This, nevertheless, proves that the capacity to enter into foreign relations is 
present. Measured in substantive terms, Taiwan has close ties with most states which 
are often even stronger and warmer than the formal ties enjoyed by the PRC. 
The lack of formal diplomatic recognition hampers Taiwan's international personality 
and it is unlikely that Taiwan can get the necessary votes for its entry in the United 
Nations in the immediate future, be it through the "representation" or "new member" 
formula. In fact, Taiwan's bid to join the United Nations should be bolstered by a 
concomitant effort at increasing the number of states with which it maintains formal 
ties. 
So the test is whether a political entity possessing all four conditions laid down in the 
Montevideo Convention qualifies as a state. There is a debate in conventional 
international law on this. The Declaratory School argues that any entity that possesses 
all the elements of a state is a state. The Constitutive School, however, argues that such 
entity must be recognized by other states to qualify as a state. In this latter view, 
recognition is actually used by states as a foreign policy tool. While the Montevideo 
Convention clearly embraces the Declaratory School, state practice, however, seems 
to follow the Constitutive School. The ROC definitely qualifies as a state under the first 
view and qualifies as a "state" within the meaning and practice of the United Nations 
Charter. Although some people invoke the second view and argue that the ROC is not 
a state, it really is. 
Article 3 of the Montevideo Convention states: "The political existence of the state 
is independent of recognition by the other states. "37 Just because the United States 
does not recognize Castro's Cuba does not mean that Cuba is not a state. The same can 
be said about Libya. In fact, the United States even supported North Korea's admission 
to the United Nations in 1991 (because it wanted to seat South Korea), when the United 
States had no diplomatic relations with it and did not recognize it. 38 Furthermore, 
36 When the General Assembly acted to strip its membership in 1971, Taiwan was paying 4 percenr 
of the United Nations budget, because that amount included the mainland. By contrast, the PRC now pays 
only 0. 77 percent, an amount that does not even include Taiwan. See House of Representatives, Should 
Taiwan be Admitted to the United Nations?, supra note 21, at 3; United Nations, Image & Reality: 
Questions and Answers About the United Nations, How It Works, and Who Pays for It (New York: 
United Nations, 30 April 1993), at 72. 
37 Montevideo Convention, supra note 33, Article 3. 
38 Bolton argues that the issue of recognition of Taiwan by the United States is irrelevant to, and 
should be separated from, the issue of whether the United States should support Taiwan's admission !ll 
the United Nations, see H. Con. Res. 63, supra note 26, at 46. Harvey Feldman put it this way: "We 
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Article 6 clarifies the nature of recognition: "The recognition of a state merely signifies 
that the state which recognizes it accepts the personality of the other with all the rights 
and duties determined by international law. Recognition is unconditional and 
irrevocable. "39 Judging from the language and the spirit of the Montevideo 
Convention, those countries that have used recognition as a foreign policy weapon 
against others have in fact violated international law. However, it is not uncommon to 
find glaring gaps between international law (what ought to be) and international politics 
(what is) and the argument against Taiwan's statehood is certainly one such 
dishonorable example. 
The fact remains that no matter how various countries have used a denial of 
diplomatic recognition to Taiwan to serve their political convenience, 40 Taiwan's 
intrinsic statehood is well grounded, de facto and de Jure. Taiwan's ambiguous 
international personality is only caused by the major players' political convenience, not 
by an intrinsic lack of statehood on the part of Taiwan. Despite the PRC's persistent 
efforts at forcing international acceptance of Taiwan as a PRC province, through 
official records such as publications of international organizations and bilateral 
communiques on establishing diplomatic relations, Taiwan is a state separate from 
China. Nevertheless, it is also true that Taiwan's international personality has been 
seriously hampered by PRC's actions. 
Even the argument that statehood is a prerequisite for United Nations membership 
is not entirely accurate. India was a founding member of the United Nations in 1945 
even though it was still a British colony. Ukraine and Belarus were also founding 
members, even though they were manifestly part of the Soviet Union. In other words, 
even if Taiwan were a PRC province, United Nations precedent would not bar separate 
membership for Taiwan. 
Another confusion is that statehood is a prerequisite for diplomatic recognition. The 
PLO does not meet the customary international standards of "statehood", as described 
above, but is recognized by some 90 nations as "the State of Palestine", representing 
Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and the Gaza Strip.41 
recognize the ROC up until midnight on 31 December 1979. At 12:01 a.m. on 1 January 1979, we no 
longer recognized it as a state. Does that mean it stopped being a state during these two minutes because 
we stopped recognizing it? Of course not. All that means is that we withdrew diplomatic recognition. It 
was a state. It is a state." Id. at 48. 
39 Montevideo Convention. supra note 33, Article 6. 
40 The United States Department of State has maintained that the so-called "one China" policy has 
been a successful policy and has served United States interests well. See Wiedemann's testimony in H. 
Con. Res. 63, supra note 26, at 66-71. Criticizing the State Department's bureaucratic inertia and self-
congratulation, John Bolton, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization in the Bush 
Administration, remarked: "For fifteen years at the State Department, it was also 'inconvenient' to the 
Middle East peace process to seek repeal of the General Assembly's 'Zionism is racism' resolution .... 
The question of ROC representation in the United Nations will ... also be 'inconvenient' at State for 
fifteen years, or longer." Id. at 84. 
41 As the self-rule provided under the Israel-Palestine peace treaty expands and becomes more 
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So none of these legal arguments can provide a consistent case why Taiwan is not 
a state and why Taiwan should not have a seat in the United Nations. Taiwan is a state 
and it is a peace-loving state. Unlike the PRC, which was condemned as an aggressor 
in 1950 by the United Nations for its actions in the Korean War, the ROC has never 
been an aggressor. In fact, with its well-known economic development experience, the 
ROC has, in recent years, begun to provide humanitarian aid, economic and technical 
assistance, feedback to the international society. 
Taiwan is a peace-loving state but was forced out of the United Nations due to 
political reasons and is facing an uphill battle to reenter the Organization. Why does 
Taiwan want a seat in the United Nations after it has been out for 24 years? 
6. The Case for a United Nations Seat for Taiwan 
Taiwan wants a seat in the United Nations for several international and domestic 
reasons. 42 The first reason, and the most obvious one, is that Taiwan meets all 
qualifications of a peace-loving state and, therefore, it should be a member of the 
United Nations. But being a peace-loving state, able and willing to accept international 
obligations, is unfortunately only a necessary but not sufficient condition for United 
Nations membership. The reason for Taiwan's exclusion is not legal, but political. 
The second reason is based on the United Nations ideal of universal representation 
and fundamental human rights for all. The fact that the rights of such a significant 
group of people (21 million) are disregarded is a disgrace to the United Nations. In 
some cases the interests and lives of these people may be jeopardized if they do not 
have a representative in the Organization. One only has to consider the case of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, one of many specialized agencies of the United 
Nations. Taiwan is close to China, one of the world's five declared nuclear powers, and 
North Korea, a dangerous nuclear aspirant. It is unfair to the people of Taiwan that 
policies that literally could affect their very existence are being developed completely 
without their participation. 
The third reason is that Taiwan has become an increasingly important global player. 
Excluding such a player from this comprehensive international organization will 
seriously impair the working of the international system. Taiwan produces the world's 
twentieth largest GNP ($244 billion); its personal income level (measured in GNP per 
capita) is the 25th highest in the world ($11, 604); it is the world's fourteenth largest 
institutionalized, one expects the Palestinian Self-Rule Authority to gradually acquire statehood. 
42 For ROC's official views on this, see Chan Lien, The Republic of China on Taiwan Belongs in tlie 
United Nations, 37 ORBIS 633 (1993); Fredrick F. Chien, UN Should Welcome Taiwan. FAR EASTERN 
ECONOMIC REVIEW, Aug. 5, 1993, at 23; Jason C. Hu, The Case for Taipei's U.N. Representation. 
address at the Atlantic Council of tl1e United States, Sept. 17, 1993; The Republic of China on Taiwan: 
A WortlJy Nation Deserves a U.N. Seat (Taipei: Government Information Office, November 1993). 
Various other official position papers can be found at internet site http://gio.gov.tw. 
j 
Can Taiwan Join the United Nations? 99 
trading nation (with exports and imports over $178 billion); its foreign exchange 
reserves, nearing $100 billion, trail only that of Japan; it is the seventh largest investor 
in the world and second only to Japan in Asia.43 Yet such an important trading nation 
is not even a party to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 44 nor is 
it a member of the International Maritime Organization or the World Intellectual 
Property Organization to name but a few. 
Exclusionary politics sometimes get downright insane and inhumane. According to 
one account, Taiwan in 1994 donated $2 million to refugee relief in Rwanda, a purely 
humanitarian gesture, but it had to do that through the United States Committee of the 
United Nations Children's Fund, because Taiwan is not a member of the United 
Nations. 45 At one point in 1995, a senior foreign ministry official proposed a donation 
of $1 billion to the United Nations, if Taiwan were given a seat in the organization. 
The idea was censured as buying a United Nations admission ticket. That $1 billion 
would, nevertheless, have provided 81 % of the annual budget. 46 Clearly, the world 
community is not serving its own interests by refusing to accept such a willing donor. 
Rights and obligations go hand in hand. Without according Taiwan its entitled rights 
and yet expecting it to honor the same duties as everyone else does, the international 
community can only hope, but not ensure, that this key player would "play by the same 
rules." To ensure this, what better way than to include Taiwan in these bodies. There 
are many functional areas which really know no boundaries, such as environmental 
pollution and ozone layer depletion. A solution has to be found to bring Taiwan into 
the international society. This is because global problems can best be solved by 
collaboration of all, not just some, players. 
The fourth reason is that the United Nations has in the past accommodated the 
contending sides of divided states through the parallel representation scheme (Germany 
and Korea). As the German case illuminates, such an arrangement has not hindered the 
internal political evolution of Germany. In fact, other inter-governmental organizations 
such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) forum have established various precedents, whereby Taipei and Beijing can 
43 All statistics cited are 1994 figures, unless noted otherwise. The sources for these numbers include 
TAIWAN STATISTICAL DATA BOOK, 1995 (Taipei: Council for Economic Planning and Development, 
1995); FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Oct. 12, 1995; FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Nov. 10, 
1995; Should Taiwan be Admitted to the United Nations?, supra note 21; Winston Lord, U.S. Policy 
Toward East Asia and the Pacific, United States Department of State Dispatch, Vol. 6, No. 9 (Feb. 27, 
1995); RAY s. CLINE, THE POWER or NATIONS IN THE 1990s: A SlRATEGIC ASSESSMENT (Lanham, 
Maryland: University Press of America for the United States Global Strategic Council, 1994). 
44 Currently Taipei is negotiating with the World Trade Organization, GATT's successor, about its 
accession. All GATT members will automatically become WTO members. The GATT/WTO case is 
interesting, because the ROC wisely applied as "Taiwan, Peng-Im, Kin.men, Matsu (Separate) Custom 
Territory" under Article XXXIII of GATT, thereby establishing an international identity separate from 
that of the PRC. 
45 Yu-ming Shaw's testimony in H. Con. Res. 63, supra note 26, at 106. 
46 Calculation based on Image & Reality, supra note 36, at 72. 
100 Vincent Wei-cheng Wang 
both part1c1pate, with the GATT/WTO likely to follow.47 It is, therefore, not 
unrealistic to find a creative arrangement to accommodate Taiwan in the United 
Nations. It has to be pointed out, however, that the United Nations General Assembly 
is a consummate political body, where power sways. Furthermore, the PRC holds a 
veto in the Security Council. So it may be very difficult for Taiwan to return to the 
United Nations via its General Assembly. Formal representation in the United Nations 
is nevertheless the ultimate solution to Taiwan's current dwarfed diplomatic status. 
The fifth reason is related to domestic politics. There is hardly any other case where 
the gap between a country's economic might and its diplomatic status is as outrageous 
as Taiwan's. The increasingly affluent people of Taiwan have become impatient with 
the unjust treatment they receive from the international society and demand more 
dignity. For the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (OPP), the issue of joining 
the United Nations is tantamount to a formal declaration of the independence of 
Taiwan. Seizing the popular discontent with Taiwan's international status, the OPP 
sought to put the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) on the defensive. The government 
responded by its own campaign but was rather ambivalent for fear of fueling 
independence aspirations. The KMT and the DPP, at least in rhetoric, both want 
Taiwan to return to the United Nations. They differ, however, on the means to achieve 
this goal. The OPP wants Taiwan to join the United Nations as a new member state, 
the Republic of Taiwan. The KMT, by contrast, would only avow that Taiwan should 
be allowed to participate in the United Nations, leaving important issues such as the 
name and methods of entry undecided. Although sometimes ambiguity permits 
creativity, it may also be politically costly, as the next section elaborates. 
7. How Can Taiwan Enter the United Nations? Scenarios and Strategies 
It is clear why Taiwan belongs in the United Nations, but the question is how to get 
there? The government's approach is an open-ended yet passive one. In 1993 it knocked 
on the United Nations' door for the first time, by requesting seven Central American 
states to ask the United Nations to create an ad hoc committee to report to the General 
Assembly about the special case of Taiwan. In 1994 and 1995, similar proposals were 
put forth, endorsed by 12 and 15 member states, respectively. 48 But each year the ad 
hoc committee proposal came before the General Committee, the PRC used its clout 
to keep the item off the agenda. This constitutes "a moratorium in reverse", namely the 
PRC can now just muffle the fight. But ironically the PRC's experience of entering the 
United Nations can provide some insights for Taiwan. 
47 ADB official documents refer to the ROC as "Taipei, China" and to the PRC as "China, Peopk's 
Republic of". The APEC summit meeting of November 1993 in Seattle established a precedent. Vincent 
Siew, chairman of Taiwan's Council of Economic Planning and Development, participated as "President 
Lee Teng-hui's representative" whereas the PRC was represented by President Jiang Zemin. 
48 The draft resolutions and explanatory memorandums are reprinted in Appendix 5. 
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7 .1. PREREQUISITES 
Diplomatic Recognition 
In fact, there are some prerequisites for Taiwan's United Nations bid. First, Taiwan's 
United Nations bid will have a much more realistic chance when more states have 
diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The bottom line is politics: the PRC got enough votes 
in 1971, so it was seated. When Taiwan has enough votes, it will be admitted. 
Informal, substantive diplomacy, though strong, is no substitute for formal diplomacy 
on such highly symbolic political issues. Taiwan's departure from the United Nations 
in 1971 presaged many countries' shift of recognition. Conversely, a resolution on 
Taiwan's status by the United Nations will herald other states' diplomatic 
reassessments. This is perhaps why the government's stance is to hope that the United 
Nations will study a solution that is acceptable to most members. But this is not enough 
to satisfy the domestic constituencies. 
Plebiscite 
So instead of asking the United Nations to decide how Taiwan could join, Taiwan 
should first decide itself how it wants to join the United Nations. Therefore, a national 
debate, albeit divisive, is inevitable. The second prerequisite, therefore, is a plebiscite 
on this issue. 49 Plebiscite, or the concept of national self-determination, is an exercise 
of the "elementary right" of a people to decide their legitimate ruler and has been a 
well-established democratic practice internationally. 50 It is not enough for the 
government to proclaim a consensus for there is none. And because the United Nations 
issue is emotionally intertwined with Taiwan's fundamental identity dilemma, 
unification or independence, eventually it must be resolved one way or the other. In 
fact, it may be beneficial for the government to conduct a plebiscite. Most opinion polls 
(and inferences from election results) show that a large majority of people in Taiwan 
49 For several recent books on the increasing use of direct democracy to decide international issues 
(including issues involving sovereignty), see DA YID BUTLER AND AUSTIN RANNEY (EDS.), REFERENDUMS 
AROUND THE WORLD: Tf!E GROWING USE OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY (Washington, D.C.: American 
Enterprise Institute Press, 1994); JOHN T. ROURKE, RICHARD P. HISKES AND CYRUS ERNESTO 
ZlRAKZADEH, DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: DECIDING INTERNATIONAL ISSUES 
THROUGH REFERENDUMS (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1992); LAWRENCE T. FARLEY, 
PLEBISCITES AND SOVEREIGNTY: THE CRISIS OF POLITICAL ILLEGITIMACY (Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press, 1986). 
50 See E.H. CARR, CONDmONS OF PEACE (New York: Macmillan, 1942), at 39 ("Self-determination 
rnight indeed be regarded as implicit in the idea of democracy.") Woodrow Wilson, whose strong 
advocacy of national self-determination made it a key principle of the League of Nations, said the 
following: "No peace can last ... which does not ... accept the principle that governments derive all their 
just powers from the consent of the governed and that no right anywhere exists, to hand peoples about 
from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property." J Ol!ANNES MATTERN, THE EMPLOYMENT or 
THE PLEBISCITE IN THE DETERMINATION OF SOVEREIGNTY (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1920), at 76. Both quotes are cited in FARLEY, supra note 49, at 4-5. 
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favors a status quo, i.e. neither open declaration of independence nor immediate 
reunification with the mainland. A formal plebiscite would presumably reflect this fact. 
Such a plebiscite should further affirm that the ROC is the only legitimate 
government on Taiwan and the associated islands. This proclamation, albeit a seeming 
departure from the arcane "one China" policy, will provide a legal pretext to avert the 
PRC's claim and will open the door for other states' recognition (of this fact). 51 The 
OPP has for years advocated a plebiscite (to legitimate independence), the government 
can in effect preempt and win on this issue. It seems that only a plebiscite, which 
allows all voters to decide on the name and approach of Taiwan's United Nations 
participation, can form a genuine national consensus, a "pact" which neither party can 
further argue about. 
More importantly, the results from a plebiscite will unambiguously inform the United 
Nations and the world about the real wishes of the people of Taiwan, so these wishes 
are less likely to be ignored. After all, the principle of national self-determination is not 
entirely moribund. 52 If the United Nations can monitor an election in Eritrea (then part 
of Ethiopia), respect its people's wishes and accept it as a member and if the United 
Nations can accept so many separate members resulting from the breakup of the former 
Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, why can it not do the same in the case 
of Taiwan and its 21 million inhabitants? In fact, numerous plebiscites have been 
conducted in recent years: West Irian, the Cook Islands, Equatorial Guinea, Okinawa. 
and several of the United States Pacific Islands. Had the vote for Quebec to secede 
from Canada passed in 1995, Canada and the United Nations would probably have 
accepted it. 
The China Factor 
Taiwan's bid to join the United Nations would be completely effortless if the PRC did 
not exist. In fact, the PRC has constantly forced states or international organizations to 
choose between Beijing and Taipei. Given Beijing's veto power in the United Nations. 
its nuclear weapons and growing might, the choice has been "easy" -- Beijing. In recent 
years, Taipei started to pursue "dual recognition", this means that Taipei will exchange 
formal ties with a state as long as it recognizes Taipei, regardless of its ties with 
Beijing. But so far there has been no enduring precedent. So the third prerequisite for 
Taiwan's United Nations bid is to improve relations with Beijing. It may be an 
51 In 1991, by abrogating the Temporary Decrees for the Period of Mobilization and Suppression of 
Rebellion, the ROC recognized the PRC as a political entity and it also recognized that the ROC's 
governance does not extend to the mainland. In essence, it was an abandonment of the "one China" 
policy. However, such a declaration did not stipulate that only the ROC, not any other country including 
the PRC, has jurisdiction over Taiwan and the associated islands. This is why a plebiscite must establish 
this claim. 
52 For a recent defense of national self-detem1ination, see Michael Lind, In Defense of Liberal 
Nationalism, 73 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 87 (May/June 1994). 
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exaggeration to say that "the road to the United Nations is through Beijing" but without 
Beijing's acquiescence Taipei's quest for international identity will continue to be hard. 
Unfortunately, Beijing still clings to outmoded concepts of sovereignty. It has 
steadfastly maintained that the so-called "Taiwan issue" is a internal affair of China. 
This is a dangerous path for Taiwan, because in international law there is a long-
established principle of non-interference in internal affairs. 53 If Taiwan's future is an 
international issue, then it is protected by the principle of peaceful resolution of 
conflicts. 54 However, if it is an internal matter, only the PRC's goodwill can 
guarantee Taiwan's security which is a situation that is hardly dependable. So the 
United Nations bid also has enormous security implications for Taiwan. It is no wonder 
why the PRC has strenuously opposed it. 
The PRC equates Taiwan's United Nations bid (or President Lee Teng-hui's 
"pragmatic diplomacy") as a ploy to seek independence, hence a ground for using force 
against Taiwan. Since President Lee's private visit to the United States in June 1995, 
the PRC has greatly escalated military provocation and verbal assault, aimed at 
intimidating Taiwan and influence the island's important elections. No one fantasizes 
that Taiwan's United Nations bid will not face strong opposition from Beijing. 
However, Taipei must still be resolute in pursuing a goal that is crucial to its own 
security and prosperity. It will take education, patience, economic enticement and 
military preparedness on the part of Taipei to convince Beijing of the reality of a 
Taiwan separate from the mainland. The rise of independence sentiment in Taiwan is 
in large part contributed by Beijing's intransigence. By giving Taiwan more room 
internationally, Beijing can in fact expect a more confident Taiwan more willing to seek 
rapprochement and less compelled to seek independence. 
The United States Factor 
A final catalyst is the support of the United States. It was the policy of the Nixon 
Administration that led the "diplomatic stampede" of countries recognizing the PRC, 
which precipitated the ROC's rapid descent. In 1971, the ROC had diplomatic relations 
with 69 states, including the United States, Japan and most other major countries. 
Today, only some 30 countries have diplomatic ties with Taiwan. 55 Following the 
53 This principle is laid down in the Charter of the United Nations, supra note 9, Article 2(7). 
54 Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter mandates that parties to a dispute seek a pacific 
settlement thereof. One legal expert points out that action taken under Chapter VI can proceed unhindered 
by the PRC, because Article 27(3) stipulates that "in decisions under Chapter VI ... a party to a disputt: 
shall abstain from voting." The Security Council can thus use a wide range of peaceful means (even 
stationing peace-keeping forces on Taiwan) in response to PRC aggression towards Taiwan. David 
Scheffer, International Legal Implications of a PRC Use of Military Force Against Taiwan, in PARRIS 
H. CHANG AND MARTIN L. LASATER (EDS.), IF CIIINA CROSSES THE TAIWAN STRAIT: THE 
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1993), at 62. 
55 South Africa is the only important international player. The African National Congress (ANC) has 
a long relationship with Beijing, dating back to the apartheid era. President Mandela has said that he 
lacks the "moral courage" to break diplomatic ties with Taiwan. This means he would if he could. 
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United States example, the world settled in a diplomatic complacency: maintaining 
formal ties with Beijing and informal ties with Taipei. 
In fact, the world community faces a classic "collective action" problem in dealing 
with Taiwan.56 That is, if each country deals with the PRC bilaterally, it is always 
compelled to choose Beijing over Taipei because of the lure of a market of one billion 
people, a Security Council veto and nuclear power. It is thus compelled to go along 
with Beijing's "one China" policy which perpetuates Taiwan's plight. But if all 
countries collectively take a strong stand against Beijing over the Taiwan issue, they can 
succeed. The obvious issue is who that "political entrepreneur" willing to shoulder the 
costs of providing the public good will be. In other words, who will provide the 
leadership that is necessary to overcome Beijing's opposition? The answer is the United 
States. The United States has tremendous power and prestige in international 
organizations. The United States may have only one vote in the General Assembly, but 
it has a veto in the Security Council. In organs adopting weighted voting, like the 
World Bank, the United States has 33 % of the vote. If the United States really wants, 
it can help seat Taiwan in international organizations, including the United Nations. In 
fact, the United States has done so in the case of the ADB, APEC and GATT/WTO. 
An in-depth analysis on the United States role in Taiwan's United Nations efforts is 
beyond the scope of this chapter. The clear division of opinions on this issue will 
briefly be outlined here. An increasing number of people in Congress favors a more 
active role for the United States in trying to help Taiwan to get a seat in the United 
Nations. 57 Understandably, the United States government does not support Taiwan's 
United Nations cause, arguing that it will harm United States-China relations. However, 
it pledges to support Taiwan's membership in international organizations that allow non-
states to join.58 As the case of President Lee's visit suggests, if these congressional 
resolutions receive overwhelming support in Congress, the Administration feels more 
pressure to reverse its policy. Furthermore, the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States 
56 The classic treatise on how collective action problems arise and how to overcome them is MANCUR 
OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (Cambridge. 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1965); see also RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982). 
57 Various draft resolutions have been advanced, culminating in the Solomon-Torricelli-Lantos-Burton-
Ackerman-Deutsch Resolution, H. Con. Res. 63, supra note 26. These resolutions, if passed, express 
a "sense of Congress" and have no binding force on the executive branch. In contrast, legislative acts do. 
See Should Taiwan be Admitted to the United Natior.s?, supra note 21; H. Con. Res. 63, supra note 26. 
58 To supplement Wiedemann's testimony, the State Department submitted a statement saying that 
"(t]he Administration does not support H. Con. Res. 63 and does not support Taiwan's participation in 
the United Nations. The United States could accept any solution to this issue that is consistent with the 
United Nations Charter and is agreed upon by the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait." Wiedemann 
argued that even the passage of H. Con. Res. 63 would prompt China to "react severely based on its 
conviction that this is a direct attack on its national sovereignty by pulling back entirely from its 
relationship with the United States; finding every possible way it could to see areas in which it could 
affect negatively United States interest." H. Con. Res. 63, supra note 26, at 39, 41, 45; Central News 
Agency News Wire, Dec. 18, 1995, accessible at internet site http://www.taipei.org. 
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domestic law enacted in the aftermath of derecognition to maintain and enhance 
relations between the United States and Taiwan, mandates the United States government 
to support Taiwan's membership in international organizations, especially financial 
ones. 59 
7.2. MODELS 
Regarding the capacity of Taiwan in the United Nations, six models can be compared. 
Note, however, that these models are mainly heuristic devices, created to stimulate 
discourse and thinking. 
The first model is the exclusive representation model: reversing Resolution 2758 and 
seeking to replace the PRC in the United Nations as the only representative of China. 
This is not only impossible but also undesirable, because it would unjustly exclude 1.17 
billion people. 
The second model is the new state model: applying to the United Nations as a new 
state, for example the Republic of Taiwan. As much as DPP idealists preach this, it is 
also impossible because (1) the PRC would veto it and (2) Taiwan cannot get two-thirds 
of the votes in the General Assembly. 
The third model is the German and Korean model: parallel representations for both 
the PRC and the ROC. This is in essence a "two Chinas" formula. It is the ROC 
government's preference. 
The fourth model is the ADB and APEC model: coexistence of one "China, People's 
Republic of" and one "Taipei, China" (in essence an "one China, one Taiwan" 
formula).6() Presently this may be Taiwan's best hope. However, whether such an 
improvised arrangement can lead to a diplomatic breakthrough for Taiwan is a big 
question. For instance, how can other states recognize "Taipei, China" or "Chinese 
Taipei" as a state? 
The fifth model is the Soviet Union model: multiple representations yet one central 
government. To forestall United States predominance in the United Nations at the time 
of founding, the Soviet Union insisted on having two more seats in the United Nations 
(Belarus and Ukraine who could not, however, conduct foreign policy). This model, 
in essence a "one country, two systems" model, may be Beijing's eventual offer. 
59 Section 4(d) of the Taiwan Relations Act stipulates: "Nothing in this Act may be construed as a 
basis for supporting the exclusion or expulsion of Taiwan from continued membership in any international 
financial institutions or any other international organizations." Taiwan Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 96-8, 
Apr. 10, 1979, Sec. 4(d), 93 Stat. 14 (1979), codified at 22 U.S.C. 3301. The Taiwan Rt:lations Act is 
reprinted at 18 I.L.M. 873 (1979) and in ROBERT L. DOWNEN, OF GRAVE CONCERN: U.S.-TA!Wi\N 
RELATIONS ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE 1980s (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, Georgetown University, Significant Issues Series Vol. 3, No. 4, 1981), at 52-58. 
60 When GATT/WTO does admit Beijing and Taipei, it will set a new precedent: one China and one 
"Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu Custom Territory." But this is essentially a variation of the 
ADB/APEC model. 
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The last model is the Vietnam model: one seat for one unified country. Should one 
day the PRC rule Taiwan, it can indeed claim to represent the people on Taiwan. If 
such were the case there would be no need to have more than one system. This is the 
PRC's current position, obviously an unpopular one in Taiwan. 
At present time, the "bargaining set" or feasible outcomes are really between the 
fourth and the fifth model. 61 The fourth model is not all bad, since it allows Taiwan 
to participate in the international society, albeit not quite equally. But even this narrow 
set contains much room for creativity. Furthermore, if international politics should 
continue to evolve in Taiwan's favor, then the third or even the second model may 
become possible. Hopefully, a solution can be found to simultaneously satisfy Taiwan's 
yearning for dignified international participation, China's concern about "face" and the 
international community's real need to incorporate Taiwan. 
7.3. APPROACHES 
Three approaches of participation are discussed here, each with differing degrees of 
effectiveness and problems: (1) seeking membership in the United Nations, (2) seeking 
observer status in the United Nations, and (3) participating in United Nations programs 
and affiliated organs. These three approaches are not mutually exclusive; rather they 
should be used in tandem or in sequence. 
Membership 
This approach, namely knocking on the front door, has the advantage of driving home 
the issue. However, the current politics in the United Nations and Taiwan's setback in 
the last three years suggest that membership in the Organization may be the fruit, rather 
than the catalyst, of a long fortuitous process. In addition, repeated setbacks may 
further frustrate Taiwan's people and put more pressure on the government. Still, this 
approach is worth pursuing with care, since it keeps the issue alive. The more the 
international society knows about the problem (without solving it), the more it will feel 
ashamed and obliged. Time is on Taiwan's side. 
An interesting strategy under the "front door" approach, namely repealing Resolution 
2758, is suggested by John Bolton. Condemning 2758 as illegal, Bolton dispels the 
myth that resolutions adopted by one United Nations General Assembly cannot be 
repealed by another. He cites the repealing in 1991 of the 1975 Resolution 3379 
("Zionism is racism"). He argues that this strategy essentially means for the General 
Assembly to correct its own mistake. And because re-recognizing the representatives 
of the ROC is not an admission of a new state, it does not involve the Security Council 
61 On these game-theoretical concepts, see HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART & SCIENCE OF NEGOTIArIO~ 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1982); PETER c. ORDESHOOK, GAME THEORY 
AND POLITICAL THEORY (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 
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or PRC veto power either. He argues that repealing 2758 is a prerequisite for 
reinstating the miscarried "dual representation" scheme of 1971.62 
Observer Status 
Over the years, the United Nations has given "observer status" to four types of entities, 
which entitles them to participate in all plenary and other United Nations meetings 
without the right to vote, as well as in international conferences organized by the 
Organization: (1) states that are not United Nations members, such as Switzerland and 
the Holy See; (2) liberation movements, such as the PLO; (3) intergovernmental 
organizations, such as the Organization of African Unity; and (4) specialized agencies, 
such as the International Atomic Energy Agency.63 
Observer status has the advantage of giving Taiwan a (incomplete) representation 
while avoiding a challenge to Beijing's sovereignty. Switzerland, Monaco, the Holy 
See, East Germany, West Germany, North Korea, South Korea and the PLO, at one 
time or another, have all enjoyed observer status at the United Nations. As an observer, 
Taiwan would gain the opportunity to address issues important to it without a right to 
vote. There is no doubt that when the Palestinians will one day have their own state, 
they will seek full membership, not just observer status. For Taiwan this would also be 
a transitional and unsatisfactory arrangement. But if such status is soon granted, Taiwan 
should not reject it. 
Based on his study of sixteen United Nations observer cases, James C. Hsiung finds 
that the United Nations Secretary-General, upon an application for observer status, has 
an almost summary right to make a final decision. In all past cases, when the Secretary-
General asked the General Assembly for a retroactive review following a decision he 
had made, the Assembly invariably accepted his decision. However, Hsiung argues that 
this route is now closed for Taiwan, because the PRC, following Taiwan's aborted 
"study committee" endeavor in 1993, went straight to Boutros Boutros-Ghali and served 
him notice that the PRC would object, pre hoc to Taiwan's entry in any form, including 
observer status. 64 
United Nations Programs and Specialized Agencies 
In contrast to the "front door" approach described above, Taiwan can join the United 
Nations through the "back door", i.e. through United Nations programs or specialized 
agencies and autonomous organizations within the United Nations system. This 
incremental approach, though less flamboyant, should not be discounted. Figure 3 
shows that the United Nations stands at the hub of a network of specialized international 
organizations and bodies. Some of these are operated directly by the United Nations 
62 See his prepared testimonies in Should Taiivan be Admitted to the United Nations?, supra note 21, 
at 75-85; H. Con. Res. 63, supra note 26, at 81-95. 
63 Image & Reality, supra note 36, at 35-37. 
64 James C. Hsiung, Prospects of ROC's Participation in International Organizations, paper presented 
at the Fifth International Symposium on China, University of Indianapolis, Sept. 28-30, 1995. 
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General Assembly; some are formally affiliated with the United Nations but are 
autonomous; some are unconnected with the United Nations. Despite their publicity (or 
notoriety), the General Assembly and the Security Council are really not where the 
main action affecting our daily lives takes place. The bulk of the daily work is carried 
out in the numerous specialized functional agencies and organs that weave together 
people across national boundaries into a truly interdependent world. 
The United Nations Programs are overseen by the General Assembly through the 
Economic and Social Council in order to advance economic development and social 
stability in poor Third World states. The funding of these programs comes partly from 
the General Assembly and partly from contributions of member states, businesses or 
even private charities. If the PRC objects to Taiwan's proposal, for example, to donate 
$1 million every year to the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund 
(UNICEF) for vaccinating Third World children against diseases, a purely humanitarian 
measure, it will undoubtedly make enemies for the PRC and win friends for Taiwan. 
Today Third World countries constitute more than two-thirds of the United Nations 
membership. Gaining support from this key "voting bloc" is, therefore, critical to 
Taiwan's United Nations bid. As Section 4 points out, the decisions of the General 
Assembly on representation in the specialized agencies are only advisory and not 
binding. This is even more true for the autonomous agencies. They are masters of their 
own house and have different requirements for membership; some allow non-United 
Nations members or even non-states to join. 
At least a dozen affiliated organizations permit non-United Nations members to join: 
the International Maritime Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the 
International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Labor Organization, the 
International Telecommunications Union, the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization, the Universal Postal Union, the World Health Organization, the World 
Intellectual Property Organization, the World Meteorological Organization, the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank. All except the IMF and the World Bank permit automatic membership for 
United Nations members who wish to join.65 
In light of this, it is very appropriate for Taiwan, as a key economic power, after its 
accession to GATT/WTO, to join the World Bank and the IMF. It is also proper for 
the United States to support Taiwan's entry into these international financial bodies. Jn 
fact, the weighted voting system in these bodies, as opposed to the "one state, one 
vote" system in the United Nations, can further augment Taiwan's influence. Taiwan 
will be a major donor that will benefit many borrowing nations, including the PRC. 
It is these "low profile" yet practical bodies where Taiwan should immediately start 
to seek positive participation. After all, Taiwan has been missing from the international 
scene for too long. And with its admirable economic success and political 
democratization, Taiwan will play a very influential role in these bodies, establish a 
65 See H. Con. Res. 63, supra note 26, at 36. 
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positive reputation, accumulate goodwill and support and coincidentally foster a separate 
identity (as perceived by others) from Beijing's. 
Aside from its permanent Security Council seat and veto, Beijing is really not a 
major player in the United Nations. It adopts a very low profile in the General 
Assembly and is hardly visible in the technical and specialized agencies. It is also the 
major recipient of loans and grants from the IMF and the World Bank. For the PRC 
to block Taiwan's entry into the IMF and the World Bank is like for the borrower to 
dictate from whom the bank can receive money. The PRC contributed just 0.773 
($7.85 million) to the United Nations budget in 1993.66 This amount does not even 
include membership dues for the 21 million "compatriots" on Taiwan. 
By taking this three-pronged strategy, emphasizing the third approach while also 
pursuing the other two, Taiwan should see its international stature greatly improve and 
the world more ready to embrace it in a few years. The way to the United Nations may 
be long and arduous. But at least there is not just one road and the end seems to be in 
sight. The Cold War is over and this last remnant of it must eventually be swept away 
also. It is time to invite Taiwan, a prosperous and democratic nation, to the big party 
of nations. 
66 Image & Reality, supra note 36, at 72. Contrast other countries: the United States (25%, $310 
million), Japan (12.45%, $127 million), Gemiany (8.93%, $91 million), Russia (6.71 %, $68 million), 
France (6%, $61 million), the United Kingdom (5%, $51 million). China, with a population of 1.17 
billion, pays as much as Iran (population: 60 million) and only half as much as the Netherlands (1.5%, 
Population: 15.2 million). 
________________________ ! 
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Table 1 
United Nations Membership, by Years of Admission, 1945-1995 (N=185) 
Year Member States 
1945 Founding members (N =51): 
Argentina, Australia, Belarus: Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China,b 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, c Denmark, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Honduras, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Russian Federation,ct Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Syria, 
Turkey, Ukraine: United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, 
Yugoslavia 
1946 Afghanistan, Iceland, Sweden, Thailand 
1947 Pakistan, Yemen 
1948 Myanmar 
1949 Israel 
1950 Indonesia 
1955 Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, 
Lao People's Democratic Republic, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Nepal, Portugal, 
Romania, Spain, Sri Lanka 
1956 Japan, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia 
1957 Ghana, Malaysia 
1958 Guinea 
1960 Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Cote 
d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Gabon, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, 
Togo, Zaire 
1961 Mauritania, Mongolia, Sierra Leone, United Republic of Tanzania 
1962 Algeria, Burundi, Jamaica, Rwanda, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda 
1963 Kenya, Kuwait 
1964 Malawi, Malta, Zambia 
1965 Gambia, Maldives, Singapore 
1966 Barbados, Botswana, Guyana, Lesotho 
1968 Equatorial Guinea, Mauritius, Swaziland 
1970 Fiji 
1971 Bahrain, Bhutan, Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirates 
1973 Bahamas, Germany 
1974 Bangladesh, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau 
1975 Cape Verde, Comoros, Mozambique, Papua New Guinea, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Suriname 
1976 Angola, Samoa, Seychelles 
1977 Djibouti, Vietnam 
_____ _J 
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Table 1 (Continued) 
Year Member States 
1978 Dominica, Solomon Islands 
1979 Saint Lucia 
1980 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Zimbabwe 
1981 Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Vanuatu 
1983 Saint Kitts and Nevis 
1984 Brunei Darussalam 
1990 Liechtenstein, Namibia 
111 
1991 Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Marshall 
Islands, Micronesia (Federates States of), Republic of Korea 
1992 Armenia, Azerbaijian, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, San Marino, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan 
1993 Andorra, Czech Republic, 0 Eritrea, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Monaco, Slovak Republicc 
1994 Palau 
Notes: 
' Despite a seat in the United Nations, it was a constituent part of the Soviet Union 
until 1991. 
b The Republic of China, 1945-1971; the People's Republic of China, since 1971. 
'A founding member in 1945, in 1993 it ceased to exist, so its former constituent parts 
received separate membership. 
d The successor state to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 
Source: 
Adapted with permission from ROBERT E. RIGGS AND JACK C. PLANO, THE UNITED 
NATIONS: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS (Belmont, California: 
Wadsworth, 2d ed. 1994), at 45; United Nations, Image & Reality: Questions and 
Answers About the United Nations, How It Works, and Who Pays for It (New York: 
United Nations, 30 April 1993), at 72-75; United Nations Department of Public 
Information, Press Release, ORG/1190, 15 December 1994. 
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Table 2 
Vetoes in the Security Council, 1946-1994 
Time Period USA USSR/Russia China UK Frarce 
1945-55 0 77 1 0 2 
1956-65 0 26 0 3 2 
1966-75 12 11 4 9 2 
1976-85 37 7 17 11 9 
1986-90 23 0 0 8 3 
1991-94 0 1 o· 0 0 
Total 72 122 22 31 18 
Note: 
• In 1991 China abstained two times and in 1992, nine times. No other permanent 
members abstained. 
Source: 
SYDNEY 0. BAILEY, THE PROCEDURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2d ed. 1988), Table B, at 209; ANJALI V. PATIL, THE UN 
VETO IN WORLD AFFAIRS 1946-1990 (Sarasota, Florida: UNIFO Publishers and 
London: Mansell, 1992), at 485-486; United Nations, Index to Proceedings of the 
Security Council, 47th sess., 1992, U.N. Doc. ST/LIB/SER.B13.29; adapted with 
permission from KAREN A. MINGST AND MARGARET P. KARNS, THE UNITED NATIONS 
IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995), at 23. 
--- J 
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Figure 1 
United States and Soviet Union Percentage with the Majority of the General 
Assembly 
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KAREN A. MINGST AND MARGARET P. KARNS, THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE POST-
COLD WAR ERA (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995), at 41 (reprinted with 
permission). 
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Figure 2 
Voting in the General Assembly on the Representation of China 
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Source: 
A. LEROY BENNETT, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: PRINCIPLES AND ISSUES 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 6th ed. 1995), at 87 (reprinted with 
permission). 
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Figure 3 
The United Nations System 
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